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Summary  findings
Wang evaluates the strength of the effect that community  He creates a model and estimates implicit prices for
pressure and pollurion charges have on industrial  pollution discharges from community pressure, which
pollution control in China and estimates the marginal  are determined jointly by the explicit price, the pollution
cost of pollution abatement. He examines a well-  levy. He finds that the implicit discharge price is at least
documented set of plant-level data, combined with  as high as the explicit price. In other words, community
community-level data, to assess the impact of pollution  pressure not only exists but may be as strong an incentive
charges and community pressure on industrial behavior  as the pollution charge is for industrial firmns  to control
in China.  pollution in China.
He constructs and estimates an industrial organic  Wang's modeling approach also provides a way to
water pollution discharge model for plants that violate  estimate the marginal cost of pollution abatement. The
standards for pollution discharge, pay pollution charges,  empirical results show that the current marginal cosr of
and are constantly under community pressure to further  abatement is about twice the effective charge rate in
abate pollution.  China.
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I. Introduction
This paper reports an empirical analysis  of industrial water  pollution discharge  in China.  A well
documented  plant-level  data set is examined  and combined  with a community-level  data set, which
allows for a careful assessment  of the impact of pollution  charge instrument and community  pressure
on industrial behavior  in China.  An industrial  organic water  pollution discharge model is constructed
and estimated  for those plants which violate  pollution  discharge standards  and pay pollution charges
and are constantly  under pressure for further pollution  abatement  from the communities.  The impacts
of pollution charge  and community  pressure are estimated  and compared with each other.  Also
reported  in this paper are the demand function  approach  to marginal  abatement  cost estimation  and
the empirical  results of Chinese  industries.
In literature,  two recent empirical studies  demonstrated  the existence  of informal  regulation,
or community  pressure, of industrial  pollution. Using  Indonesian  data of plant-level  organic water
pollution, Pargal  and Wheeler (1996) tested and supported  the informal regulation  hypothesis  that
communities  are often able to negotiate  with or otherwise  informally  pressure polluting plants in the
vicinity  to clean up when formal regulatory  mechanisms  are absent or ineffective.  With data on
industries  in the United States,  Pargal et al. (1997)  provided support  for the idea that community-
based pressure on plants to abate pollution exists even in the presence of formal regulation.  Under
formal regulation,  the government  acts as an agent for the community.  Frequently  employed
regulatory  instruments  include both command-and-control  instruments  such as effluent discharge
3standards  and market-based  instruments  such as emissions charges.  When formal regulations  are
absent  or weak, many communities  have struck bargains  for pollution abatement  with local factories.
As pointed in Pargal et al. (1997), this community-based  informal regulation  may  take many
different forms including demands  for compensation  by community  groups,  social ostracism  of the
firm's employees,  the threat of physical  violence, boycotting  the firm's products, and monitoring  and
publicizing  the firm's emissions.  They may rely on the leverage  provided  by recourse  to civil law or
pressure  through politicians and local administrators,  or religious leaders. When formal regulatory
standards  and institutions  exist, informal regulation  can still play a significant  role in providing
incentives  for polluters  to abate pollution. One tactic a community  can use is simply  reporting  the
violation  of legal standards.  Another channel for informal  regulation  is to pressure regulators  to
tighten local monitoring  and enforcement.
While the existence  of informal  regulation  has been empirically  demonstrated,  an important
issue remains of how strong the informal regulation  is. While one can expect that informal  regulation
may play an important  role in pollution control where formal policy doesn't  exist, the importance  of
informal regulation  could be lower in a relative sense where formal regulation  is functioning. Studies
on the strength  of community  pressure, both in an absolute sense and in a relative sense with respect
to formal government  pollution regulations,  can help both for better understanding  polluters'
behavior  as well as for designing  pollution control  programs for communities  and governments.
This paper provides an empirical  estimation  of community  pressure on pollution discharges
in China where formal regulation  on industrial  pollution exists. The pressure is estimated as an
implicit  price it provides for pollution  discharges.  This implicit  price is jointly estimated  by a
discharge  demand  function with an explicit price that the current Chinese  pollution charge system
imposes  for pollution discharges.  In the estimation,  the implicit price is instrumented  with variables
including  community  economic  status and pollution discharge  situation. The estimated implicit price
is compared  with the explicit  price the government  regulation  provides. Estimation results show that
4informal  regulation  on those firms which are violating  effluent concentration  standards is at least as
strong as the pollution charge instrument  which is imposed  on the violators in China.
With the same pollution discharge  model,  this study also provides an assessment  of the
impact  of China's pollution charge  on industrial  organic water pollution discharge.  China's pollution
charge system has been widely implemented  for about 20 years. Almost all of China's counties  and
cities have implemented  the levy system, and approximately  500,000 factories have been charged for
their emissions.  Despite certain  weaknesses  in the pollution levy system, it remains by far the largest
application  of a market-based  regulatory  instrument  in the developing  world. And in sheer
magnitude,  the current Chinese  system may be without  peer in the world. However,  this system was
not systematically  evaluated until recently.  With plant-level and province-level  data, Wang and
Wheeler  (1996 & 1999)  did econometric  analyses  of levy system enforcement  and plants' responses
to the variance in the effective levy rate. These  analyses  have shown that the local enforcement  of the
levy system  has been driven by local socio-economic  and environmental  status and that industrial
firms do respond  to the levy rate changes.  Due to data limitations,  however, levy price indices
constructed  in these studies did not match very well with the levy formula employed  in practice,  nor
well fit with economic  theory in terms of the consistency  of the demand  variable and the price. This
prevented  the econometric  analyses  from being a rigorous  quantitative  estimation of the price
elasticity of pollution discharge.
This study employs  a data set with detailed information  on levy collection.  A discharge
function of organic  water pollution - chemical oxygen demand  (COD) can be constructed  and
estimated with a marginal levy  price of COD which matches both the economic  theory and the levy
practice in China.  An implicit price index  for pollution discharge  is also constructed  and
instrumented  in this estimation,  which should  be able to provide  a more accurate estimation  of the
price elasticity of COD discharge.  Analyses conducted  in this study show that the pollution charge is
only one part in the marginal  penalty of pollution discharge in China. The levy  price is about  half of
5the total discharge  price which equals  the marginal  penalty. For a firm minimizing  the total cost, the
marginal  abatement  cost should  be equal to the total discharge  price, which is about twice of the levy
price in China.
The estimation  of the pollution  discharge  demand function in this study also provides a
unique  estimation  of marginal  pollution abatement  cost. Two empirical models  have been previously
employed  in estimating  marginal  pollution abatement  cost. The total factor productivity  approach
estimates  a total cost function which combines  both production  cost and pollution control cost. The
marginal  cost of pollution abatement  can be derived  by taking the derivatives  of the total cost with
respect  to a specific  pollutant. This marginal  cost estimation  takes into consideration  of pollution
reduction  both in the production  process and the end-of-pipe  treatment. However  this method has
been rarely used because  of heavy data requirements. Another method that has been used is the end-
of-pipe  treatment approach  which estimates  an end-of-pipe  treatment cost function. A marginal
abatement  cost can be estimated by taking derivatives  of the abatement  cost with respect to a
pollutant.  This approach  only considers  the pollution abatement  option with the end-of-pipe
treatment.
The demand function  approach  to marginal  abatement  cost estimation,  employed in this
study,  requires information  on prices of pollution  discharges.  Just as the total factor productivity
approach,  this approach  can provide a correct estimation  of industrial firms'  pollution abatement
costs which takes into consideration  both the production  process and the end-of-pipe  treatment. To
author's  knowledge,  this is the first empirical estimation  of pollution abatement  cost with a pollution
discharge  function.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides further background  information
about the pollution  control practices  of those Chinese industries  which have to pay a uniquely
designed  fee for pollution  discharge and are also under constant  pressure of other formal and
informal  pollution control  measures as well. Section III presents the model for pollution discharge
6where firm characteristics,  input  prices, community  pressure and formal regulation  are identified  as
the major determinants.  Data and variable  descriptions  are presented  in section IV, and section  V
provides estimation  results. Section VI concludes  the paper.
II.  Institutional  Background
Chinese  industry has been fast growing  in the past two decades  with an average annual increase  rate
about 15%.  While about 50% of the total value of output comes from those industries  established
originally  by farmers,  which are mostly  privately owned,  a significant  portion of the industry,
especially  those large firms, are state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs). Those state-owned  enterprises  face
imperfect  market competition.  The prices of the outputs are partly regulated  by the government  even
though recent reforms have brought more autonomy  to the SOEs. While plant managers'  incomes are
more and more correlated  with the economic  performances  of the plants and it is in most plant
managers'  interests  to maximize  profits, firms are facing  constraints  additional  to those set by the
market in their practices  of minimizing  the total costs. One example  is the target of minimum  values
of output set by the government  for some plants.
There are a set of pollution control  policy instruments  applied to Chinese industries 2. The
central  government  set up the general requirement  of regulation  according to the environmental  laws,
and it has been the local governments'  responsibility  to enforce and improve the regulations  set by
the central  government.  There are command-and-control  approaches  such as the requirement  of
environmental  impact assessments  for new construction  projects and the requirement  of design,
construction  and operation  of pollution  treatment facilities  simultaneously  with the construction  or
expansion  of industrial  production  facilities. After the production  processes are in place, the emission
2 For a detailed  review of China's  pollution  control system,  see Sinkule  and Ortolano  (1995).
7standards  and effluent concentration  standards  apply. However,  while the command-and-control
approaches  are implemented,  it is not illegal to violate  those requirements.  It is not until recently  that
a firm or its manager  can be prosecuted  for violating  environmental  standards. If not polluting
extensively,  firms may not be seriously  penalized,  even when violating  abatement  deadlines that are
sometimes  issued by local environmental  authorities.
To provide incentives  for industrial  firms to control pollution, the environmental  regulators
have relied heavily on a market-based  approach since  the early 1980's. For more than a decade,
hundreds  of thousands  of firms have had to pay a fee if their discharges  did not meet the discharge
standards 3. The Chinese  environmental  protection  law specifies  that "in cases where the discharge  of
pollutants exceeds  the limit set by the state, a compensation  fee shall be charged according  to the
quantities  and concentration  of the pollutants released."  In 1982 after three years experimentation,
China's State Council began nationwide  implementation  of pollution charges. Since  then billions  of
Renminbi (RMB)  have been collected each year from hundreds  of thousands of industrial  polluters
for air pollution,  water pollution, solid waste, and noise. In 1996,  the system was implemented  in
almost all counties and cities. A total of 4 billion RMB's ($1 = 8RMB)  were collected from about
half a million industrial firms. Numbers  are increasing  each year.
There are some unique features  associated with the charge system. For wastewater,  this
system only imposes  charges on the pollutants  over the standard 4, among which, only the pollutant
which violates the standard  the most enters into the calculation  of the total levy fee. In other words,
fees are calculated  for each pollutant in a discharge stream  and the polluter only needs to pay
whichever  amount  has the highest  value among  all the pollutants.  The Chinese central  government
3Most small  industries  in the remote  rural areas  have effectively  escaped  the levy due to the weak enforcement  capacity  of
local environmental  protection  agencies.
4After 1993,  the government  started charging  for wastewater  discharges  whether  they met discharge standards  or not.
8constructs  a uniform  fee schedule,  however  the implementation  in different  regions is not uniform 5.
The levy  collected is used to finance environmental  institutional  development,  administration  and
environmental  projects and to subsidize  firms' pollution control  projects. If a firm, who pays levies to
the levy fund, decides  to invest  in pollution abatement,  a maximum  of 80% of the levy paid by the
firm can be used to subsidize  the investment  project proposed  by the firm. To make the levy
collection  effective,  a schedule  of penalties is also specified 6. Penalties can not be used to subsidize
firm-level  pollution  control projects. Although  studies have been conducted  to reform  the levy
system with most analysts  recommending  raising China's  pollution charge rate (SEPA, 1998),  few
empirical analyses  have actually  investigated  polluters' response  to the existing charges. In Wang
and Wheeler (1996),  province-level  data on water pollution  was analyzed  and it was determined  that
China's levy system had been working  much better than previously  thought. Provincial  variations in
the enforcement  of the levy appear to reflect  the local valuation  of environmental  damage and
community  capacity  to enforce local norms. The results suggest  that province-level  pollution
discharge  intensities  have been highly responsive  to provincial  levy variations.  With a joint plant-
level and city-level  data set, Wang and Wheeler  (1999) have shown that pollution intensities  of
Chinese  industries  have been significantly  responsive  to the levy system,  and that citizens'
complaints  on pollution can significantly  affect the implementation  of air pollution levy system.
While under formal regulation,  Chinese  industries  are also constantly under pressure from
local communities  for further  pollution control. Cases are not scarce in China where citizens or
citizen groups fight  with plants which are seriously  polluting local watersheds or airsheds by directly
using violence or lawsuit.  Chinese  environmental  authorities  are also responding  to a citizen
complaint  program  with which any citizen can write, call or visit the local office of environmental
authorities  for any environmental  issues. Responding  to those complaints,  environmental  authorities
5For a detailed  discussion,  see Wang and Wheeler (1996 and 1999) and SEPA (1998).
9investigate  the issues  mostly by doing field inspections.  Issues are for the most part settled with
polluters' correcting  the problems.  Each year hundreds  of thousands  of complaints  are received.
Studies have shown that these complaints  have significantly  increased  the numbers of inspections
(Dasgupta  et al. 2000) and increased  the effective  rate of pollution charge (Wang and Wheeler,
1999),  and have contributed  to pollution  reduction especially  for air (Dasgupta and Wheeler, 1996).
III. Model
Models estimated  in this study can be derived  directly from the general assumption  that firms are
minimizing  the total cost 7. Assuming  that C is the total cost of inputs that a firm spends on the
production  process  and the pollution treatment facilities. C is then a function of x, the total amount
of a certain residual  or pollutant such as chemical oxygen demand (COD). The firm discharges  x to
the environment  and gets a penalty of F due to this discharge.  F is also a function  of x.
A firm minimizes  the sum of total input  costs (C) and total penalty (F) of pollution discharge
(x):
(1)  minimize  C(x)+F(x).
To solve for the optimization  problem,  the first order condition is:
(2)  DC/ax  + aF/ax  =0.
The first term in the first order condition (2) is the cost reduction  of an extra unit of pollution
discharge.  Therefore,  the marginal  abatement  cost (MAC) of x is,
(3)  MAC = - AC/ax.
6 The  penalty schedule  is usually  referred  as "four small parts"  in Chinese.
7 As discussed in last section, most Chinese industries face additional constraints while minimizing the total cost.
But for some firms during a certain period of time, the management objective might not be to minimize the
total cost. For these firms, the models developed in the following are invalid.
10The second term in the first order condition (2) is the marginal  penalty of pollution discharge,
which can also be defined as pollution  discharge  price P:
(4)  P = aFax
When F is a linear function  of x, P is a constant.  The first order condition  (2) prescribes  that a
firm abates its pollution  up to a point where the marginal  abatement  cost equals the marginal  penalty
of pollution discharge.  From (2), one can solve for a pollution discharge  demand function  given
discharge  price P:
(5)  x = f (P).
While the total penalty (F) of a pollution discharge  x may include both a financial penalty,
such as paying a discharge  fee, and other damages  to the firm, such as reputation  damages  with law
suits, citizen complaints  / demonstrations,  and risk of being shut-down,  etc., the pollution discharge
price P also has two parts: one corresponding  to the explicit  financial charges (P1) and another
corresponding  to implicit damages  to the firm (P2).
The marginal  abatement  cost function can be derived from equations  from (2) to (5), as,
(6)  MAC = f-'(x).
Therefore,  a marginal  abatement cost function  (MAC) can be obtained by first estimating a pollution
discharge  demand  function (x = f(P))  and then taking an inverse  of the demand function.
In this study,  a COD discharge  demand function  will be empirically  estimated  for Chinese
industries  which have to pay a price for COD discharges  and are constantly under strong  pressure
from local communities  for further  pollution reduction.  To estimate  equation (5) for COD, four sets
of variables or determinants  need to be identified:
a)  plant characteristics  (f), which includes  sector,  output, ownership  (for efficiency),  vintage (for
technology),  etc.;
11b)  market prices (m), which includes  manufacturing  wage, materials price, capital price, energy
price, stock price of the plant, etc.;
c)  community  characteristics  (c), such as income,  education,  environmental  quality, population,
etc.;
d)  pollution  regulation  (r), including  pollution charges,  inspection,  etc.;
Assume a simple functional  form of COD discharge  as follows:
(7)  x =  aP
where x is a parameter which is determined  by plant characteristics  (f) such as total value of output,
sector, ownership, etc., and market prices (m). That is,
(8)  a =  t(f, m).
,B  is a parameter  to be estimated,  which is the price elasticity of pollution discharge. P is an
aggregate  price for the discharge of pollution COD. Price P is a function of variables for pollution
regulation  and community  characteristics,  i.e.,
(9)  P = P(r, c).
With further  assumptions  on the functional  form of P, such as,
(10)  P=yr 1c 6 2,
the relative contribution  of different sets of variables  to the variance  of pollution discharge can be
estimated  by substituting  (10) into (7).
In the Chinese  case, which will be presented in the following,  the formal regulation  is a charge
on pollution discharge,  from which an explicit price, the effective  charge rate or levy price, P1 can be
observed.  Equation (10) becomes,
(11)  P=yPIcK 2 .
12The implicit pollution discharge price generated by community pressure, or non-levy price, P2, can
then be estimated by subtracting P1 from P; i.e.,
(12)  P2=P-PI .
In estimation, y in equation (11) can be identified with an appropriate assumption such as the
minimum implicit price P2 is zero in a society. In this case, estimated P2 would be a lower bound of
the community pressure on pollution discharge.
IV. Data and Variables
A plant-level  dataset of 1500 industrial firms in 1994, which was randomly selected from a nation-
wide random sample, was provided by China State Environmental Protection Administration for
conducting analyses of economics  of industrial pollution control in China. All plants were under
close monitoring  by state and local environmental authorities, and information about pollution and
production was well documented. Among the 1500 firms, effective levy prices can be estimated for
about 200 firms which discharged  COD at a level above the COD discharge standards and paid
discharge levies for the part of COD discharge above standards. City-level data about average wage,
water pollution discharge concentration and population density in 1994 were collected from China
urban statistical yearbooks.
Table  1 lists the major variables used in the model. The dependent variable is the total COD
discharge of a plant. Plant characteristics  include sector, state ownership, and value of output. For
sectors, paper, chemical, food, and textile are water pollution intensive sectors. Their impacts on
COD discharge are expected to be positive. State-owned plants are expected to be less efficient, so
the impact on COD discharge is expected to be positive. Value of output measures the scale of a
plant. COD discharge is expected to grow with output, and the effect on COD discharge is expected
13to be positive. However, the elasticity of pollution with respect to value of output is expected to be
significantly  less than one because of the scale economies.
For market input prices, the city-level average wage was available and can  approximate  for
the manufacturing wage. As an input price, wage should have a positive  impact on COD discharge.
However, wage is also a measure of wealth. Empirical studies on informal regulation have shown
that wealth is positively correlated with the strength of informal regulation of pollution, and therefore
wage can also have a negative effect on COD discharge.  So, there is not a prior expectation of the
sign of the variable wage. There is also a possibility that the wage is an endogenous  variable because
high income people may move away from pollution intensive areas. However, it is not expected to be
a problem because population mobility was extremely low in China in 1994.
Input price information is also reflected in the model by a dummy variable "coast." In the
coastal areas of China, materials price, capital price, energy price as well as manufacturing wage are
all higher than in non-coastal  areas. However, income, education and population density are also
higher in the coastal areas, which are most important determinants of strength of informnal  regulation
according to previous empirical studies (Pargal and Wheeler,  1996; Wang and Wheeler,  1996).
Therefore the possible effect of the variable "coast" is ambiguous and it is an empirical issue.
Two more community variables in table 1 are population density and average water pollution
discharge concentration. Both of the variables are expected to have negative effects on COD
discharge. The higher the population density, the stronger the informal regulation of pollution. The
worse the overall water pollution, the higher the demand of water pollution control, and therefore
informal water pollution regulations should be stronger.
The explicit COD discharge price is defined as the total levy paid for the above-standard
COD discharge divided by the total COD discharged at a concentration  level above the standard. It is
an observed marginal economic penalty of COD discharge. The impact of the levy price on total
COD discharge is expected to be negative. There is a possibility that the levy price is endogenous  in
14the COD model because there are cases observed in China where final levy collection is negotiated
with the plants. However, this problem is not expected to be serious in this study because the selected
plants were under close monitoring by state environmental authorities and it was not very likely for
them to be able to bargain with environmental authorities to reduce levy payments.
V.  Results
5.1  Discharge  Function  Estimation
An econometric  model is estimated  with the data described above.  Table 2 lists estimates  of
8 coefficients .As expected,  plant characteristics  play a significant  role in determining  the COD
discharge. The elasticity of COD discharge with respect to value of output is about 0.63. The state
owned enterprises  discharge  more COD. Water pollution intensive  sectors such as paper, textile, food
and chemical  industries  have significant,  positive coefficients.
The COD levy price has a highly significant,  negative impact  on COD discharge.  The
elasticity  is close  to -1. Dummy variable "coast" is found to be significant  and negative in the COD
discharge  equation.  Due to multicollinearity  between  these community  variables, other variables do
not show significance.  However,  when these community  variables  are included in the model
individually,  they are all significantly  negative,  except variable  log(wage).  Since the primary  purpose
of this analysis  is to estimate relative  importance  of community  pressure with respect to formal
pollution regulation,  the insignificant  community  variables are included in the final analysis  to
enhance the robustness  of the estimation.
8 Stata  Robust  procedure  was used  to correct  the possible  White  heterogeneity  associated  with  cross-section  data.
155.2  Levy and Non-levy  Price
The empirical model estimated  in table 2 is based on the models previously  presented in section III.
Specifically,  the price function  of (10) is specified in this study as,
(10)'  P = yPl*Q~lD 62 w63e&4*coast
Where P1 is the levy price; Q is the city-level COD discharge  average concentration;  D is population
density; W is city-level  average wage; and coast is a dummy  variable of 1 for plants locating  in
coastal areas  and 0 for locating  in non-coastal  areas. 61, 62, 63, and 64 are all positive parameters.
The parameter  cc  in model (7) is specified as,
(8)'  a =  aO*yYiW 82e 03Coast+  04 State  +  aSector
where variables W and coast reflect input prices for production  and pollution abatement. 01, 02 and
03 should be positive. The econometric  model estimated  in this study is as,
(13)  ln(x)  - ln(a) +  3  ln(P)
= (ln(ao)+1  ln(y)) + 01 ln(Y)  + 04 State + L co  Sector + f3  ln(P1)
±  (f  61) ln(Q) + (p 62) ln(D) + (3 63+04) ln(W) + (p 64+03) coast + error,
where ,  should  be negative.
Because  of the dual roles of variable W and coast for input  prices and community  pressure,
parameters  associated  with these two variables cannot be fully identified without  further restrictions
on the parameters.  Because  the purpose of this estimation  is to assess how significant  community
pressure is on pollution control relative  to the formal pollution regulation,  an estimation  of the lower
bound of community  pressure is sufficient  for this exercise.
In order to get a lower bound of the estimation  for community  pressure, following  restrictions
are further imposed:
a.  03z=04=0;
16b.  y=l/min(Q5ID  2 WB 3eM*cost).
Restriction  (a) underestimates  63 and 64, while restriction  (b) imposes  that the minimum  of
community  pressure  on pollution abatement  be zero. With restrictions (a) and (b), all parameters  in
the model can be identified.
While assuming  the minimum  implicit price generated  from market and community  pressure
on COD discharge  in the sample is zero,  y is estimated  to be about  2.7. The total COD discharge
price P is then estimated for each plant. Subtracting  levy price P1 from the total price P, the non-levy
price P2 is then estimated.  Table 3 provides the mean and the median estimation  of levy, non-levy
and total prices,  as well as the ratio of P2 to P1.
The estimation  results in table 3 reveal that the non-levy  price is almost  equal to the levy
price in general. The levy price in the coastal areas is not significantly  higher than in the interior
regions, while the non-levy  price in the coastal areas is 2-3 times of the non-levy  price in the non-
coastal areas.  Therefore  the total price is higher in the coastal areas. In coastal areas, non-levy  price
is higher  than the levy price. No significant  difference  is found in the total prices  between the state
sector and non-state sector. However,  in the non-state  sector,  the non-levy price is higher than the
levy price. While no significant  difference  can be found between  the levy price and the non-levy
price with different  industrial sectors and different scales  of plants,  paper industries  are found to face
the lowest total marginal  penalty of COD discharge  and large plants  are paying less for one more unit
of COD discharge.
No other formal regulation  variable  other than pollution levy is included  in the model. For
those plants in the sample  which were paying fees for their violations of the COD discharge
standards,  it is not very likely that other formal policy instruments  practiced  in China would have
systematic  impacts  on the variance of COD discharge.  Nevertheless,  missing these instruments  in the
17model could cause an overestimation of the levy price  if they are positively correlated with the levy
price.
5.3  Marginal  Abatement  Cost
The scale  parameter  cc  in the discharge  function  (7) can be estimated  as a function  of value of output,
state and sector  when parameter y is identified  in the model (13) while restriction  (a) is imposed.
Then marginal  COD abatement cost can be estimated  with the functional  form,
(14)  MAC  = (X/a)-PM
With restriction  (a), MAC is underestimated.  Table 4 lists MAC estimates  for plants with different
scales, and different  sectors and at different  levels of percent COD reduction from current discharge
levels. A plant at a medium level of output  and COD discharge  is selected  from each plant category
to do the simulation.
In table 4, the paper industry can be found to be an outlier, with highest COD discharges  but
lowest abatement  costs at the current  discharge level. While the marginal  abatement cost with paper
industries  can be higher  than other sectors when they are at same levels of COD discharges,  currently
it is clearly  a correct strategy for China  to focus more on paper industries  in order to address the
organic  water  pollution problem.
VI. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper analyzes the relative strength  of informal  regulation  when formal regulation is present.
Using  Chinese data on plant-level organic  water pollution from those industrial plants violating
discharging  standards,  the author estimated  a pollution discharge demand  model which includes
18variables  for both formal and informal  regulation.  The sample selected  includes  those plants which
discharge  water pollution at a concentration  level above  the discharge  standards set by environmental
authorities  and which pay the government fees for those above-standard  discharges.  An effective
discharge  price, the levy  price, is then constructed  and estimated for the model. Community  variables
such as average  wage, pollution status, population  density,  etc., which are associated  with informal
regulation,  are included in the model as well. The estimation  results show that both formal regulation
and community  variables are significant  determinants  of the water pollution discharge  behavior.  The
relative strength  of informal regulation  is the estimated  with respect  to formal regulation.
A conservative  estimation of the strength  of informal  regulation  show that it is at least as
strong as formal  regulation.  The marginal financial  penalty of pollution discharge  estimated  in this
study is more or less reflecting  the strength  of formal  regulation.  However,  the estimated  non-levy
price is a lower bound estimation  of the implicit  price generated  from community  pressure on
pollution discharge.  There are two reasons for it to be a lower bound. First, the market input price
effect is embedded in the non-levy  price estimation.  Because  the input price effect on pollution
discharge is positive,  the negative  effect of non-levy  price on pollution discharge  should be smaller
than the negative  effect caused by the community  pressure.  Secondly,  the minimum  non-levy  price is
assumed  to be zero while it should be positive given the fact that the pollution control  effort is far
from being satisfied  by the citizens  in China.
In the literature,  there are only few econometric  studies on determinants  of pollution
discharge  at the plant level. Econometric  estimation of pollution discharge demand  with a well
constructed  discharge  price is even more scarce.  With a well documented  plant-level data set from
China,  this is the first such study. Not only are the effects of a pollution charge system examined
quite rigorously,  possible impacts of community  variables are also jointly assessed. The study shows
that the Chinese  pollution levy system has been quite effective in providing incentives  at least for
those industries  which are violating  water pollution discharge  standards  to control  pollution.
19The strong impacts of community  variables on an industry's  discharge  performance  in China,
found in this study, may not stop functioning  even when plants are in compliance  with discharge
standards. As long as a community  is dissatisfied  with its pollution situation,  the pressure  from the
community  would be expected  to continue.  This pressure  can be either directly imposed  on polluting
plants, or indirectly  via government  pollution control authorities  through "formal"  channels  such as
the citizen  pollution complaint  program,  found to affect regulators' efforts in monitoring and
enforcement  of regulatory  programs such as the pollution  charge system (see Wang & Wheeler 1996
& 1999  and Dasgupta et al. 2000).  A cost-effective  strategy for promoting  pollution regulation  in
China can be to provide  pollution information  services  to communities,  given the status of economic
development  in the communities.
The marginal  cost estimation  shows that the paper industries  have highest COD discharges
but lowest abatement  costs at the current discharge  level. While the marginal  abatement  cost with
paper industries  can be higher than other sectors when they are at the same levels of COD discharges,
currently  it is clearly a cost-effective  strategy  for China  to focus more on paper industries' pollution
abatement  in order to address the industrial organic  water pollution problem..  While they are close to
those estimates  with engineering  approaches  conducted  in China,  the results of this study could be
the lower bounds  of the true abatement  costs due to that the input price effects are assumed  to be zero
in the estimations.
It is also worthwhile  to point out that the estimated  levy price is only about half of the
estimated  marginal  abatement  cost in this study. This should not be viewed  as in conflict  with the
conclusion,  which can also be drawn from this study, that the Chinese pollution levy instrument  is an
effective  policy instrument.  The reason is that there are other formal and informal regulations  which
are jointly with the pollution levy system providing  incentives  for industrial firms to abate pollution.
In practice, an effective levy price should always  be lower than a firm's marginal abatement  cost as
20long as there are other positive  pressures  for the firm to abatement  pollution and the firm is to
minimize  the total cost.
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23Table 1. Variable Description
Variable name  Definition  Mean  Variance
COD  Total COD discharge  248.2  942.6
(10,000  ton)
OUTPUT  total value  of output  25746  91304
(10,000  yuan)
STATE  Dummy  for state-owned  .71  .46
firms
PRICE  total levy on COD over-  700  855
standard  discharge  / total
over-standard  COD
discharge:  yuan / ton
WAGE  average  wage of the city  3869.9  1208.5
where the firm locates
CODCON  average COD discharge  341.5  177.4
concentration  of the region
POPDEN  Population  density  (lIKm2)  1604  1340
CHEMICAL  Dummy  for chemical  .14  .34
industry
DRUG  Dummy  for drug industry  .15  .36
FOOD  Dummy  for food industry  .22  .42
PAPER  Dummy  for paper industry  .14  .34
TEXTILE  Dummy for textile industry  .17  .38
24Table 2: Discharge  Function  Estimation
Dependent  variable:  Log(COD)
Full Model  Reduced  Model
Log(OUTPUT)  .625***  .614***
(9.31)  (9.34)
STATE  .407*  .387*
(1.68)  (1.65)
CHEMICAL  1.110***  1.106***
(3.07)  (3.08)
DRUG  .740**  .768**
(2.10)  (2.21)
FOOD  .838***  .879***
(2.61)  (2.75)
PAPER  2.462***  2.512***
(6.48)  (6.67)
TAEXTILE  .622*  .673**
(1.84)  (1.99)








COASTAL  -.545*  -.417*
(-1.87)  (-1.89)
Constant  10.892**  13.627**
(2.00)  (8.54)
N  177  177
R2  0.76  0.75
F-value  38.21  45.50
t-statistics  are included  in parentheses  under  the estimated  parameters.  Asterisks  indicate  the associated  significance
levels: * for .10;  ** for .05; *** for .01.
25Table 3: Levy and Non-levy Prices by Industries
(RMB yuan / ton)
P1 (levy price)  P2 (non-levy price)  Pl+P2  P2/P1
By average  values
Whole sample  700.1  743.0  1443.1  1.06
Non-coastal  711.1  454.7  1165.8  0.64
Coastal  691.2  975.4  1666.7  1.41
Non-state  588.2  826.6  1414.8  1.41
state  746.7  708.2  1454.9  0.95
Chemical  864.3  934.7  1799.0  1.08
drug  559.5  656.1  1215.6  1.17
food  668.1  703.9  1372.1  1.05
paper  212.1  160.1  372.1  0.75
Textile  802.1  822.5  1624.6  1.03
large  630.4  695.8  1326.2  1.10
medium  737.9  808.8  1546.7  1.10
small  728.6  704.8  1433.5  0.97
By Median values
Whole sample  414.26  399.5  813.7  0.96
Non-coastal  324.4  194.1  518.6  0.60
coastal  463.5  635.2  1098.7  1.37
Non-state  361.5  439.3  800.8  1.22
state  450.2  318.7  768.9  0.71
Chemical  420.1  473.0  893.1  1.13
drug  367.5  194.1  561.6  0.53
food  504.2  439.1  943.3  0.87
paper  91.5  83.3  174.8  0.91
textile  648.0  599.9  1247.8  0.93
large  246.4  225.3  558.0  0.91
medium  495.5  442.3  1019.4  0.89
small  458.5  404.2  859.0  0.88
26Table 4: Marginal Abatement  Costs (MAC)
Sector  Scale  # of  Typical Typical  Current MAC  MAC  MAC  MAC  MAC
firms in value  COD  MAC  10%  30%  50%  70%  90%
sample of  discharge (yuan/  reduction reduction reduction reduction reduction
output  (1  Ok  ton)
(1  Ok  tons)
yuan)
Total  Large  58  25000  45  582.3  647.5  834.2  1171.1  1960.1  5933.5
Total  Medium  73  4000  12  775.6  862.5  1111.2  1560.0  2610.9  7903.7
Total  Small  49  900  2  1652.3  1837.5  2367.4  3323.5  5562.4  16838.2
Chemical  Large  10  25000  75  454.3  505.2  650.9  913.8  1529.3  4629.4
Chemical  Medium  10  3500  13  770.2  856.5  1103.5  1549.2  2592.8  7848.8
Chemical  Small  4  1200  18  2879.8  3202.5  4126.0  5792.4  9694.5  29346.5
Drug  Large  1  3  15000  58  293.9  326.9  421.2  591.2  989.5  2995.5
Drug  Medium  10  4000  12  625.7  695.9  896.5  1258.6  2106.5  6376.6
Drug  Small  4  1000  1.5  2125.6  2363.8  3045.5  4275.5  7155.7  21661.1
Food  Large  8  30000  30  976.3  1085.7  1398.8  1963.7  3286.6  9949.0
Food  Medium  17  5000  10  955.5  1062.6  1369.1  1922.0  3216.7  9737.5
Food  Small  14  1000  3.5  998.7  1110.7  1430.9  2008.9  3362.2  10177.7
Paper  Large  7  20000  1330  85.0  94.5  121.8  170.9  286.1  866.0
Paper  Medium  10  3400  360  103.9  115.5  148.8  209.0  349.7  1058.7
Paper  Small  7  1000  10  1781.2  1980.8  2552.0  3582.6  5996.1  18151.1
Textile  Large  7  32000  22  1118.0  1243.3  1601.8  2248.7  3763.6  11392.8
Textile  Medium  15  6000  6.5  1330.9  1480.1  1906.9  2677.0  4480.4  13562.9
extile  Small  8  1400  2.2  1585.7  1763.4  2271.9  3189.5  5338.1  16159.2
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